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Trade on Trial

The EU's Protectionism Problem
Meredith Kolsky Lewis
Major economies are reacting to the global financial crisis
with a number of similar strategies, including fiscal stimulus
packages, corporate bailouts, and increased protectionism.
Many world leaders, such as President Barack Obama and
former European Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson,
are decrying protectionism and calling for markets to remain
open. However, evidence of increased protectionism abounds
in multiple guises, including escalating use of anti-dumping
duties and countervailing measures, economic bailouts of
strategic domestic industries and financial services providers,
and incentives to buy locally manufactured or grown products.
This is not surprising. In times of economic difficulty,
protectionist measures tend to increase. But if it is widely
acknowledged that protectionism will ultimately cause more
harm than good to both individual national economies and
the global economy, why is it so common? This paradoxical
behavior is not limited to the context of economic crisis. Trade
negotiations frame trade -liberalizing measures in terms of
"concessions" rather than opportunities. For the majority of
trade deals, leaders and government representatives must fight
numerous political battles to sell the agreements at home.
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is a senior lecturer of international
trade law at Victoria
University of Wellington.

This article examines the risks of increased protectionism
and explains why countries nonetheless resort to protectionist measures, focusing on recent developments in the EU.
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In particular, it argues that while protectionism is harmful to an economy as
a whole, the interest groups that benefit from protectionism are often more
effective lobbyists than those that are
harmed by the protectionist measures.
However, the WTO assists its members
in guarding against those producers
who seek protectionism. This defense is
particularly crucial now as protection-

Although the EU

in society.' Olson also noted that large
groups such as consumers and taxpayers tend not to organize themselves
to advocate for their common interests, which adds to the imbalance. 2
Many industries have trade associations,
unions, and other organizational structures that provide a forum to exchange
information and develop strategies of
mutual interest. Producers are there-

is a highly integrated

customs union, it is not immune to internal
political pressure.
ist measures are, and will continue to
be, on the rise as a result of the global
financial crisis and contracting world
economy. Examples, particularly from
the EU, will be used to demonstrate
the tensions between policies at a federal level (or in the case of the EU,
union-wide) and the interests of subgroups such as subregional interests,
or national interests in the case of the
EU. The article concludes by stressing the dangers for Europe of failing
to re-engage and conclude the WTO's
Doha round of trade negotiations.

Interest Groups and Producer
Bargaining Power. Despite the

fore in a position to form powerful lobbies which can then seek government protection. Politicians may
perceive more pressure to respond to
issues raised by well-organized, visible
producer interest groups than to act
for the benefit of largely silent consumers. Agricultural interests in the
EU and manufacturing industries such

as steel and automotives in the United
States

are prime

examples of this.

An illustration of this phenomenon is the EU's Common Agricultural

Policy (CAP). The EU devotes close to
half of its annual budget to the CAP,
which provides extensive support to

themselves because they tend to be far
better organized than consumers. In

a discrete and well-organized group,
European farmers. The CAP was originally designed in the early 19 6 0s to
reduce Europe's reliance on imported
food. The CAP system of price supports,

his important work on collective action,
Mancur Olson noted that as a result
of the ability of relatively small groups
to organize themselves to act in their
own common interests, special interest
groups wield disproportionate power

subsidies, and other payments, coupled
with high tariffs on imports, ultimately
resulted in vastly increased agricultural production far exceeding domestic needs and led to so-called "butter
mountains," "milk lakes," and similar

obvious harm to consumers, producers manage to obtain protection for
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stockpiles of other foodstuffs. Export
subsidies have also led to increased production and have enabled some of the
surplus supply to be sold competitively
on the world market. The CAP has been
subject to intense criticism worldwide

(as have been forms of U.S. agricultural support), with many condemning
the assistance for inefficient first-world

farmers at the expense of agricultural interests in the developing world.
In addition, EU leadership has
sought to rein in the CAP due to its
drain on the EU budget. While reform
of the CAP has been underway for some
time, progress is difficult. As described
above, the inefficient farmers that ben-

efit most from the CAP-particularly
in France but also elsewhere-protest
vociferously whenever cuts in their support are debated. While EU consumers would benefit from more open
markets and the EU as a whole would

benefit financially by eliminating the
costly support programs, the benefits
would be comparatively small on an
individual basis relative to the losses

that would be suffered by the producers. Therefore, it is an ongoing struggle
to overcome the objections of the CAP
recipients and further reduce the sup-

port provided. Agriculture has played
a major role in the troubled-and now
stalled-WTO Doha round of trade

negotiations, with EU and U.S. farming interests pushing their governments
to make as few concessions as possible.

Europe's Competing Interests.
Although the EU is a highly integrated
customs union, it is not immune to
internal political pressures. On the
contrary, the union has a double layer
of self-interested parties to contend
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with: the first is the agricultural and
other producer interest groups within
the various member states and the second is the governments of the individual nation-states to whom those
producers are raising their demands
for protection. Thus, today we see that
EU member countries are increasingly
responding to the economic downturn
by acting in their own interests rather
than that of the EU common market.
There have been overtures to domestic consumers to buy domestic products. For example, in the relatively
liberal United Kingdom, there is much
rhetoric in the supermarket sector
advocating buying locally grown items
and contemplating labeling on the basis
of "food miles."3 Even more strongly
in Ireland, Minister of Finance Brian
Lenihan beseeched Irish citizens to
do their "patriotic duty" by shopping
in-country rather than in Northern
Ireland.4 EU member states have also
focused on strengthening home producers at the expense of larger EU economic and trade integration. French
President Nicolas Sarkozy recently proposed a 6-billion-euro bailout of the
French auto industry. In February he
said, "ifwe are to give financial assistance to the auto industry, we don't
want to see another factory being moved
to the Czech Republic." 5 Germany has
also sought to protect its auto industry,
cutting non-wage labor costs on several
occasions with the intent of preventing outsourcing and keeping factories
in the country.6 Germany has had in
effect for a number of years the controversial "VWlaw" which ensures that
the German state of Niedersachsen can
retain its stake in the Volkswagen auto
manufacturer. 7 In Italy, Prime Minister
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Silvio Berlusconi suggested that if an
Italian company, Indesit, abandoned
plans to relocate to Poland, it would
be eligible to receive a piece of a 2-bil8
lion-euro state-aid rebate program.
In contrast to these national leaders,
the EU leadership is speaking out against
protectionism and rejecting some calls
for significant bailouts of national industries. Current EU President
and Czech Prime Minister Mirek
Topolinek has decried the protectionist
actions of member states, warning that
If big countries continue to behave
in a protectionist way, they will
only repeat the scenario of the
1930s.. .The response of the eurozone countries to the financial
and economic crisis deformed the
joint project of the euro more than
any other imaginable event. Most
of the national states using the
euro started breaking the common
rules by their declarations as well
as by practical steps, while the basic
anchor of the whole process is to
adhere to these common rules. 9
Thus, Europe is experiencing tension between entrenched local interest
groups and those who set policy for the
union as a whole. This tension leads
to what can be described as a prisoner's dilemma. Any given country would
likely agree that its citizens will benefit
more if its trading partners' markets
are open rather than closed. However,
any given country may also recognize
that the best scenario would be for its
trading partners' markets to be open
while it provides protection to its own
producers. Unfortunately this kind of
thinking, while eminently rational, will
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in the aggregate lead to the inefficient
result of all countries protecting their
own markets. This helps to explain why
at the national level governments sometimes succumb to the temptation to
provide assistance in the form of protectionism to domestic industries, and
it also illustrates why international disciplines on protectionism are necessary.
By virtue of having joined the WTO
and become subject to its rules, members have changed the payoff structure
such that it is no longer as tempting to
be protectionist because there are negative consequences to so doing. In particular, the WTO provides disciplines
that limit members' ability to impose
certain types of protectionist measures.
However, the WTO rules can be financially costly and politically difficult for
members to enforce against one another. This reality, and the fact that the
Doha round negotiations have stalled,
has led some countries to push the envelope in terms of protectionism, particularly given the economic downturn.
The temptation to engage in protectionism also exists in the context
of free trade agreements and customs
unions. Studies of regional integration
in models of endogenous protection
demonstrate that the shift to preferential trading leads to a concomitant
increase in protection against those outside the trading area.'0 Indeed, despite
Topolinek's anti-protectionist stance,
the EU itself has occasionally succumbed
to the temptation to have its cake and eat
it too by providing protection domestically while taking advantage of markets
that remain open elsewhere. The EU
leadership announced earlier this year
that it was reinstating an export refund
program for European dairy farmers
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that had been suspended two years ago.
While termed an "export refund," the
program is essentially an export subsidy
in that it provides payments to farmers that are conditional on exporting.
Export subsidies are considered to be
the most trade- distorting of all forms of
agricultural support measures because
they fundamentally alter comparative
advantage. When producers receive
payments that are tied to their export
activities they naturally elect to increase
their level of exports in order to receive
the subsidy. The payments lower the
farmers' costs of production and therefore permit them to sell at lower prices
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to any interim agreements reached.
Instead, there will be no formal, binding agreement on any new liberalization
measures until all of the negotiations
have been concluded in the form of a
completed round. Thus agricultural
export subsidies are still permitted for
now, though they are subject to disciplines set out in the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture and the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
Whether or not the EU's reinstated
export subsidies breach the letter of
these agreements is unclear; however,
they unquestionably violate the spirit of the Doha round negotiations.

Europe isexperiencing tension between
entrenched local interest groups and those
who set policy for the union as a whole.
overseas than they would otherwise be
able to. Producers in other countries
who would be able to produce more
efficiently and sell more cheaply than
competitors in the absence of export
subsidies now find themselves losing
market share and receiving lower prices
due to the influx of subsidized exports.
Agricultural export subsidies are
particularly problematic because they
have been employed historically by
wealthy countries at the direct expense
of agricultural sectors in developing
countries. Agreement has been reached
in the WTO's Doha round of trade
negotiations to phase out all agricultural export subsidies over a multiyear period following the conclusion
of negotiations. However, because
the Doha round is a so-called "single
undertaking," members are not bound

New Zealand and Australia, both of
which export dairy products without
resorting to subsidies, reacted swiftly
and sharply to the EU's actions." New
Zealand Trade Minister Tim Groser
registered his concerns with European
officials, including European Trade
Commissioner Baroness Catherine
Ashton and European Commissioner
for
Agriculture
and
Rural
Development Mariann Fischer Boel:
I related our desire to see an early
end to the recently reintroduced
EU dairy export subsidies and of
the growing concerns.. .that the
EU action could lead to an escalation of trade protection. I also
reminded ministerial counterparts... that G2o and APEC leaders last year had explicitly directed
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Trade Ministers to conclude the
Doha Round of trade talks and
not to resort to protectionist measures during the economic crisis. 2
WTO Director- General Pascal Lamy
has also warned against a return to
beggar-thy-neighbor policies: "There
is another spectre lurking in the mist
which could make this already bad situation even worse-the threat of a return to
3
the isolationist policies of the I93Os.'9
Given that the European leadership is well aware of the dangers of
resorting to protectionism in the current economic climate, and has even
denounced the protectionist measures
of member states, it is a bad sign for
global economic prospects to see the
EU backsliding and reinstating one
of the most pernicious forms of support available. It illustrates mounting
tensions between the EU leadership
and its single Europe objectives, and
the increasingly nationalistic concerns
and demands of the member states.
At times it may seem politically necessary to provide relief on an EU-wide
basis, if only to forestall member states
taking matters into their own hands.

Conclusion.

Tim Groser,

Pascal

Lamy, and Mirek Topoldnek are correct in their assessments. Protectionist
actions will only lead other countries
to respond with their own marketclosing measures, which will deepen
recessionary trends. Governments that
are implementing fiscal stimulus packages are doing the right thing; the
global economy needs to be spurred
to produce more, not less, and the
way to accomplish this is to provide
incentives for growth and consump-
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tion. In this context, it would be highly
beneficial to restart the Doha round
negotiations and find a path towards
an agreement. The EU benefits significantly from the market access and
rules-based disciplines the WTO provides. The best way to assist European
economies will be, as elsewhere, to
open up markets overseas to provide
more access for European products.
Nonetheless, the EU has its work cut
out for it. Individual members have
fierce interests in protecting domestic
constituencies-particularly the highly
subsidized agricultural sector-from further liberalization. The EU leadership
will have to combat pressures emanating
from individual members, however, or
the future will become even bleaker. The
longer that the Doha round languishes,
the more members will continue their
pursuit of free trade agreements and
other selective trading arrangements.
While the EU is itself a very large
and growing customs union, it may
not fare as well long-term if individual free trade agreements overtake the
WTO in relevance. The United States
has engaged in preliminary negotiations to join the Transpacific Strategic
Economic Partnership Agreement
(TPP), which currently comprises
New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei, and
Chile. Australia, Vietnam, and Peru
will also be a part of these negotiations if they resume. 4 Resuming and
advancing the negotiations would represent a savvy move on the part of the
United States to gain a foothold into,
and to help shape, the agreement that
is likely to serve as the catalyst for a
much wider Asia-Pacific free trade
area. If the United States and Asia
join, Europe may be the odd man
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out. With this prospect looming, even
distantly, Europe would do well to
take the necessary steps to help get
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Doha going again. Getting the member states to buy into this plan, however, may prove exceedingly difficult.
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